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ABSTRACT 
IEEE 802.11 Wireless LANs (WLANs) are highly sensitive to 
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks carried out with jamming devices. 
In this paper we focus on 2.4GHz wideband constant jammers. 
The interest in the wideband jammer lies in the fact that it beats all 
possible channels at the same time, leaving no possible escape 
following traditional channel-switching defenses. After studying 
and developing an effective detection mechanism, we propose the 
implementation of a load balancing technique based on cell 
breathing for mitigating the harmful effects of the jammer over an 
IEEE 802.11 WLAN. Cell breathing is achieved by dynamically 
tuning the transmission power to adjust the size of a WLAN cell. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
C.2.3 [Network Operations]: Network Monitoring; C.4 
[Performance of Systems]: Fault Tolerance; C.2.4 [Distributed 
Systems]: Distributed applications. 
General Terms 
Algorithms, Management, Performance, Security. 
Keywords 
IEEE 802.11 WLANs, Resource Management, Jamming. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
IEEE WLANs have gone through a big evolution since their first 
steps. Victims of their own success, due to the permanent growth 
in the number of Wi-Fi users along with an increase on their 
traffic demands, the IEEE 802.11 working group is unceasingly 
studying new amendments to such an extent that they have used 
up the whole (occidental) alphabet. One of the key issues that 
required an in-depth revision was security. As a consequence, the 
IEEE 802.11i amendment was released to add the levels of 
privacy that Wi-Fi users demanded. Nevertheless, security is not 
only about privacy and authentication; there are other threats that 
should be taken into account. A natural objective of an attacker is 
to drastically reduce the throughput of the network. This can be 
achieved by jamming the channel with simple and cheap devices 
that are within the reach of the non-expert public. From [1], a 
jammer is an entity who is purposely trying to interfere with the 
physical transmission and reception of wireless communications. 
After experiencing the impact of a wideband wireless jammer, in 
section 2 we define a jammer detector mechanism that runs in an 
IEEE 802.11 access point (AP). In section 3 we discuss possible 
defenses against a jamming attack and propose the utilization of a 
load balancing technique based on cell breathing in order to 
reduce the impact of the jammer. In section 4 we evaluate the 
effectiveness of our approach. Finally, conclusions are given in 
section 5. 
1.1 The Jammer 
For our study we used the CVSAL-3405, a portable wireless 
jammer that interferes with communications in the following 
bands: 895 to 1000 MHz, 1195 to 1300 MHz and 2395 to 2500 
MHz. The total output power on its three omni-directional 
antennas is 450mW.  
Following the taxonomy established in [2], this device could be 
considered a channel-oblivious memoryless jammer. That is, in 
contrast to other smart jammers (e.g see [3]) this jammer ignores 
the IEEE 802.11 MAC procedures and constantly transmits 
energy to the channel regardless of its state and independently 
from its past actions. Even though this jamming mechanism is not 
particularly efficient in terms of energy, according to our tests its 
battery life spans up to two hours, although it starts losing 
effectiveness after 90 minutes. 
The impact of this jammer on an IEEE 802.11 transmission was 
measured in an indoor environment where a semi-open office 
propagation model is applicable [4]. In this scenario, and as shown 
in Fig. 1, the jammer is able to completely block communications 
within a radius of 5m, although its impact is still noticeable when 
the jammer is 60m away. Obviously, the grade of the impact 
depends on the distance between the jammer and its victims, and 
also on the modulation used in the communication. For example, 
when the most robust modulation available is used (1 Mbps 
DBPSK), the jammer has no effect if it is more than 20m away. In 
contrast, a faster but less robust modulation (e.g. 11 Mbps CCK) 
is affected even though the jammer is at a distance of 45m or less. 
 The interest in this simple yet effective jammer lies in the fact 
that it beats the entire spectrum available for 2.4GHz ISM 
applications. Unlike “smart” or MAC-aware jammers, which can 
be avoided by switching the frequency channel in use, there is no 
possible escape from a wideband jammer. 
1.2 Attacking an 802.11 transmitter/receiver 
The IEEE 802.11 MAC procedure [5] provides two operating 
modes: Distributed Coordination Function (DCF) and Point 
Coordination Function (PCF). However, only DCF devices can be 
found on the market today. 
The DCF uses the CSMA/CA algorithm: before initiating a 
transmission, a station’s clear channel assessment mechanism 
(CCA) senses the channel to determine whether it is idle or busy. 
If the medium is sensed idle, the station is allowed to transmit. If 
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the medium is sensed busy, the transmission is delayed. Basically, 
the physical layer provides a busy/idle medium recognition based 
on the detection of any energy above a given threshold. In 
consequence, a jammer could completely block a transmitter by 
sending energy above the carrier sense threshold. This is also 
known as the exposed node problem. 
After a successful reception, the receiving station must send an 
acknowledgement frame (ACK) back to the transmitter. If the 
sending station does not receive an ACK after a specified period 
of time, it will assume that the frame was received in error and 
will retransmit the frame after a randomly chosen backoff time. 
Similarly to the hidden node problem, if the jammer is far from 
the transmitter, but close to the receiver, the transmitter may infer 
that the channel is idle when the receiver is being jammed, and 
will send its frames. From the receiver’s perspective, the jammer 
interference is added to the desired transmission thus degrading 
the signal to interference and noise ratio (SINR). A decrease in the 
SINR entails an increase in the number of packet errors. IEEE 
802.11 standards define several sets of modulations and coding 
rates for the different physical layers. For example, IEEE 802.11b 
specifies four modes: 11Mbps (8-bit CCK), 5.5Mbps (4-bit CCK), 
2Mbps (DQPSK) and 1Mbps (DBPSK) to be used in the 2.4GHz 
frequency band. Each different scheme provides a different 
transmission rate, but the higher the chosen rate, the worse it 
performs in the presence of noise and interference. 
In order to observe the differences we predicted about the impact 
of the jammer depending on the direction of the traffic (tx or rx), 
we measured the saturation throughput (UDP) between two 
stations placed 5m apart. The jammer is in line of sight with only 
one of the stations. Fig. 1 shows the different behaviors that 
appear when the station affected by the jammer is transmitting or 
receiving, using a robust and a faster modulation. For a robust 
modulation, it is more effective to target the transmitter’s CCA. 
On the contrary, a faster modulation is more sensitive to packet 
errors produced at the receiver. Note that the probability that a 
frame is received in error increases by increasing the frame size. 
On the other hand, bigger frames make the protocol more 
efficient. As a result, we observed that the frame size has no 
impact on the performance of the network under jamming. 
2. DETECTING A JAMMER 
As stated before, the presence of a jammer is evident after a 
noticeable decrease in the carried throughput. However, such a 
decrease could be easily explained by other causes (e.g. the 
Occam’s razor would lead us to think that users have reduced their 
offered traffic). In [1] authors propose the use of the packet 
delivery ratio (PDR), defined as the ratio of packets that are 
successfully delivered compared to the number of packets sent. 
Note that both an increase in the number of active stations (i.e. 
increased collision probability), and a channel degradation 
produced by the nodes’ mobility, etc. will produce a low PDR. For 
these reasons, authors suggest the combination of PDR with signal 
strength measurements: a low PDR together with high signal 
levels mean that there is an ongoing attack. However, as stated in 
[6], even a small interference may cause a low PDR. 
A more sophisticated mechanism is proposed in [7] which 
determines whether the distribution of the explainability of the 
collisions (i.e. the probability that a collision can be explained by 
the events observed in the network) deviates significantly from 
that under normal conditions. Although their model can be 
extended, in its current form it assumes that all reception errors 
are caused by collisions (ignoring poor channel conditions). In [8], 
the AP measures the transmission delay of its clients. Then, if 
there is a sudden increment of the delay, the client is considered 
under attack, since it may have reduced its transmission rate due 
to the interference caused by the jammer. However, as with PDR, 
this fact can also be explained by mobility, obstacles, etc. 
2.1 Our approach: deferred transmissions 
All the aforementioned detection mechanisms are not effective 
when the jammer is close to the transmitter, since it will defer any 
transmission upon detection of a busy channel. In this case, Xu et. 
al. [1] propose measuring the carrier sensing time (CST), that is, 
the time a station waits for the channel to become idle. 
Unfortunately, the value of CST increases not only in the presence 
of a jammer, but also when number of active stations is high. 
However, the CST during normal operation may be determined 
theoretically or empirically and thus compared to the values 
obtained under jamming. Building a complete mathematical 
model that captures the IEEE 802.11 MAC is extremely difficult 
and would require a considerable amount of computational 
resources. Recall that our aim is to develop a detection mechanism 
that runs in low featured devices (i.e. the APs). Therefore we 
focus on the second approach. 
The accurate measurement of the CST requires access to firmware 
functions or hardware registers that are not always available to the 
developer. In contrast, other manufacturers, such as Intersil eased 
this task by opening access to their Prism chipset documentation 
and software. Among the measurements offered by Prism devices 
to higher layers, the TxDeferredTransmissions counter, which 
represents the total number of MSDUs for which one or more 
transmission attempt was deferred to avoid a collision [9], could 
be as useful as the CST. Whenever a transmission is deferred due 
to a CCA channel busy indication, TxDeferredTransmission is 
incremented. Therefore, the following ratio: 
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where TxFrames is the total number of frames that have been sent 
to the channel, defines the average number of transmission 
attempts per frame. A jammer will produce an increment in Tf, but 
this value also increases with load. In order to distinguish between 
normal and abnormal failed attempts, we implemented a threshold 
mechanism based on Tf measurements carried out in different 
scenarios. The AP measures load and Tf periodically; if Tf is above 
Figure 1. Normalized throughput measured under jamming 
the value expected for that load, a jammer is present. The load is 
measured in terms of occupation time. In our implementation, a 
linux-based AP running the HostAP driver [10] and a Prism 2 
WLAN card, measures the portion of time spent in transmitting 
and receiving frames. As detailed in [11], this can be easily done 
thanks to the statistics provided by the driver. The maximum 
expected values for Tf, obtained after a large number of 
measurements in different scenarios, are shown in Fig. 2. 
The resulting application occupies only 14kB of memory and 
requires low CPU resources, making it suitable for running on 
commercial APs. The detector module has been tested under 
different traffic conditions (varying offered throughput, frame 
sizes, number of active stations, etc.). In our tests, the activation of 
the jammer was always correctly detected at a distance of 50m or 
less, even before its presence could be noticeable on the carried 
throughput (cf Fig. 1). Sudden increments in Tf, after driving the 
network into saturation, did not produce false positives. Moreover, 
due to the fact that an AP periodically sends beacon frames and 
therefore has to sense the channel frequently, the our modeule was 
able to detect the jammer even when no clients were attached to it. 
HostAP driver only supports Intersil Prism chipsets, versions 2, 
2.5, and 3. This limits our experiments to IEEE 802.11b devices. 
However, the conclusions derived in our study can be extrapolated 
to IEEE 802.11a/g given that all 802.11 versions share the same 
MAC layer definition, which is the origin of the vulnerabilities 
exploited by the jammer. 
3.  COUNTERMEASURES 
In [6], it is shown that adjusting certain parameters such as frame 
size or modulation is not effective to face a strong interference. 
However, as stated in [12], this kind of adaptations may be useful 
in front of some types of attack. A quick literature review shows 
that, in general, the most accepted solution is based on channel 
switching. Among these approaches there are two different types 
of defense: proactive and reactive. 
Using a proactive channel switching strategy, the network 
performs a periodic frequency hopping regardless of the channel 
state. An example of proactive defense is proposed in [13], where 
the stations change their frequency every 100 ms following a 
pseudo-random sequence that is known by all participants. In [6] a 
similar solution is described, but in that case, the hopping 
sequence is announced by the AP when it detects a degradation of 
the channel due to the possible presence of a jammer. In a purely 
reactive solution, the network moves to another frequency only 
after detecting the presence of a jammer in the channel in use. 
This implies not only the presence of a reliable jammer detector 
module (not needed in the proactive approach), but also a 
mechanism that enables the channel switch synchronization even 
for those stations that did not detect the jamming attack. In [14], 
for example, a channel switch is detected after prolonged periods 
without communication. 
Nevertheless, none of these strategies are valid in the presence of 
a wideband jammer [15]. Under such circumstances, the only 
definitive solution is to locate and neutralize the attacker. In the 
meantime, all we can do is to implement mechanisms intended to 
minimize the damage caused by the jammer. In this sense, there 
are studies focused on multihop networks that suggest to avoid the 
geographical area under attack by diverting the traffic through 
safer paths [16][17]. The case of infrastructure-based WLANs 
(use of access points, or APs) has been scarcely studied. In [8], for 
example, authors study the implicit jamming attack: the case 
where only a portion of the AP’s clients are being jammed. To 
avoid the loss of efficiency in the cell caused by the use of slower 
modulations in the communications with the affected nodes, the 
authors propose the implementation of traffic shaping techniques. 
However, there is nothing to do when the AP itself is under attack. 
In the context of the proposals that seek to minimize the impact of 
a jammer in an AP-based IEEE 802.11 network, we propose the 
use of load-balancing techniques, such as cell breathing.  
3.1 Our approach: cell breathing 
Cell breathing consists in dynamically modifying cell dimensions 
by increasing or reducing transmission power. Cell breathing is a 
side effect in CDMA networks that reduces the cell coverage 
when more users are supported, but this could be advantageous in 
load balancing techniques if optimal strategies are applied. The 
concept of cell breathing for load balancing in WLANs is as 
follows: a highly congested AP reduces its coverage radius so that 
the furthest stations lose connectivity and try to roam to less 
loaded APs. An under-utilized AP may increase transmit power in 
order to expand its coverage. Consequently, new users will roam 
to this AP and the load on neighboring APs will decrease.  
The presence of a jammer should be interpreted as if the attacked 
AP is carrying a huge load, although in practice, the effect of the 
jammer surely reduces the traffic on the AP. It is therefore 
essential that either the metrics used to assess the actual load of an 
AP take into account the effect of interference, or that a reliable 
jammer detection module is present. In [18], we showed that the 
capacity available in an AP (AAC) provides an efficient load 
metric. Logically, low AAC values  load is high. This metric 
incorporates the effects of the offered traffic, the number of 
competing stations, its physical rate and the quality of the channel. 
The details of the selected algorithm for the load balancing based 
on cell breathing are given in [20]. In short, each AP calculates its 
own load (AAC). According to its load, and compared to its 
neighbors’, an AP can be in one of the following three states: Gull 
(AP load is larger than the average load in the neighborhood), 
Fair (AP load is similar to the average load) and Willing (AP load 
is below the average load). A Fair AP will not take any action 
regardless of its neighbor's behavior. A Gull AP is willing to 
reduce its cell and will ask its neighbors for help. Finally, a 
Willing AP is willing to increase its cell in response to a 
neighbor's appeal. Willing and Gull APs will gradually adjust their 
cell sizes until equilibrium is achieved or the maximum/minimum 
transmitted powers are reached. 
Cell dimensions are established by adjusting the transmission 
power from the AP, but reducing power entails signal degradation 
Figure2. Measurement based Tf threshold 
at the receiver. However, from the client station's point of view, 
the cell dimensions are determined by the energy of received 
Beacon frames and Probe Responses. Therefore, an AP can set its 
optimal cell dimension so that the farthest client that the AP must 
serve receives Beacons above a given threshold. On the other 
hand, the power used to transmit data frames can be higher so that 
the user's experience is not degraded. 
Fig. 3 shows an example of its operation, in a scenario, where 16 
APs are evenly placed. Cell dimensions are computed following a 
semi-open office propagation model. A jammer is placed in a 
randomly chosen position (red dot at coordinates 115, 180). In the 
figure, the triangles represent the 802.11 APs, while the small 
squares are client devices, which are distributed randomly over the 
scenario. The figure on the left shows a conventional WLAN 
network, where all cells have the same size, while the right figure 
shows the behavior of a WLAN with cell breathing, where the 
APs that are closer to the jammer have reduced their coverage. In 
contrast, those APs further away have increased their cells with 
the intention of offsetting the impact of the jammer. 
4. EVALUATION 
Although the behavior of the cell breathing algorithm (CB, 
hereafter) is simulated, the throughput values used in this 
evaluation process are obtained from analytical models that take 
into account all the phenomena that affect the capacity of an 
802.11 network. This model has been described and evaluated in 
[18][19], adding the effects of the jammer shown in Fig. 1. 
To evaluate the impact of the CB technique on a network under 
the attack of a wideband jammer, a large number of simulations 
were performed in the scenario depicted in Fig. 3. That is, a 370 x 
370m square area where the position of 16 IEEE 802.11b APs is 
fixed. We assume there are no coverage gaps even if all APs are 
transmitting at the minimum allowed power (10 dBm). An 
efficient frequency management strategy is also assumed so that 
we can neglect inter-cell interference even when all the APs are 
transmitting at maximum power (20 dBm). Users are static and 
the coordinates of their position are chosen randomly. The 
modulation used for each client depends on the quality of the 
signal received from the AP and can be 1, 2, 5.5 or 11 Mbps. 
4.1 Jamming a Hotspot (in saturation) 
As explained in [18], users are static and tend to be spatially 
concentrated. In the first simulations we introduce these 
characteristics by placing users at random, but forcing them to be 
concentrated in a square area of 170x170m centered at the 
coordinates of one of the APs (138, 138). In order to maximize its 
impact, the jammer is positioned at the same point. In the first test, 
all users are in saturation, i.e. there is always a 1500 Byte 
datagram waiting to be transmitted on each client’s queue. 
Fig. 4 compares the performance of the network described when 
the jammer is inactive (Off) or active (On). We study the impact 
of the jammer in a network where the APs implement the CB 
algorithm and two other cases in which the transmission power of 
the APs are fixed: APs transmitting at maximum power (MAX) 
and APs with random transmission power (RND). At a first 
glance, it is easily observable how the CB technique improves the 
performance of the network no matter whether the jammer is 
active or not. All three transmit power strategies yield a similar 
performance when the network is highly loaded and hence the 
implementation of load balancing has little effect. The impact of 
the jammer over the carried throughput is between 20 and 40%, 
although it is slightly lower when CB is run (22% on average, 
with 29% for RND and 27% for MAX). 
But CB not only succeeds in improving the overall performance of 
the network in terms of throughput, but also it is able to minimize 
the differences in the level of service received by different users, 
even though these are affected to a different extent by the jammer. 
This level of service is measured by means of the known Jain’s 
fairness index [21]. Jain’s index can be interpreted as follows: an 
index of 1 means that all users receive the same service (measured 
in carried throughput). An index of 0.5 could be interpreted as if, 
on average, 50% of the users receive an equitable service, while 
the rest of the stations did not get any service. In this regard, and 
as shown in Fig. 4 b), the presence of CB makes a big difference. 
4.2 The jammer moves away (non-saturated) 
When all users are in saturation, the observation of the total 
throughput can be misleading, given that unaffected stations are 
able to obtain a larger throughput at the expense of the stations 
affected by the jammer. For that reason, in the following tests two 
different CBR traffic profiles are assigned randomly to the users: 
low (500kbps with 500Byte frames) and medium (1Mbps with 
1000Byte frames). In Fig. 5 a) we see how the impact of the 
jammer decreases as it moves away from the centre of the hotspot. 
With the absence of nodes in saturation, the improvements 
provided by the CB become more visible. In the worst case 
a) b) 
Figure 3. Random scenario: a) 16 APs transmitting at 20dBm b) Running with cell breathing 
scenario (jammer in the center of the hotspot), CB improves 25% 
(compared to RND) and 20% (compared to MAX). 
Another metric for fairness is given by finding the minimum 
throughput a station is able to achieve. This is shown in Fig. 5 b), 
where those stations completely blinded by the jammer are not 
taken into account. With regards to fairness, the worst case 
scenario is obtained when the jammer is halfway between two 
APs, thus affecting two cells simultaneously. Hence, jammed 
stations are not able to successfully send or receive frames to/from 
neither of the closest APs. Again, CB clearly reduces the impact 
of the jammer: in the worst case, the minimum throughput with 
CB is three times the value obtained by MAX or RND. 
4.3 Random scenario 
Finally, we show carried traffic estimations after generating and 
evaluating thousands of scenarios where both jammer and users 
are randomly distributed throughout the whole scenario, according 
to a uniform distribution. Traffic demands are also randomly 
chosen among three different profiles (saturation, medium and 
low). As expected, in this scenario the impact of the jammer is 
lower due to a higher dispersion of the users. In Fig. 6 a), the 
presence of the jammer lowers the carried throughput in nearly 
12% on average (values between 10 and 15%). In such a scenario, 
the improvements provided by the CB algorithm are less 
remarkable since the load is already balanced due to the uniform 
distribution of users. As shown in Fig. 6 b), CB improves the 
performance of a network under normal circumstances, but in the 
presence of a jammer, these improvements are even greater. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we have proposed a jamming detector module for 
IEEE 802.11 WLANs, based on the inspection of the number of 
transmission attempts per frame. The detector was implemented 
and tested in a Linux-based AP, in order to prove the effectiveness 
of our approach. The application is able to detect the jammer even 
before its impact on the carried throughput is noticeable. 
Furthermore, since there is no possible escape from a wideband 
jammer, we proposed the implementation of a load balancing 
mechanism, based on cell breathing, with the aim of minimizing 
its impact. The evaluation of this solution showed that the 
presence of load balancing effectively reduces the impact of the 
jammer, both in terms of throughput and fairness. 
Although our study is based on 802.11b, the conclusions derived 
from both the study of the detection process and the evaluation of 
our approach can also be extrapolated to 802.11a/g given that all 
802.11 versions share the same MAC layer definition, which is the 
origin of the vulnerabilities exploited by the jammer. 
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